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In this article, we present ideas related to three key aspects of mindfulness training: the regulation 
of attention via noradrenaline, the importance of working memory and its various components 
(particularly the central executive and episodic buffer), and the relationship of both of these to 
mind-wandering. These same aspects of mindfulness training are also involved in the preparation 
and execution of movement and implicated in the pathophysiology of psychosis. We argue that 
by moving in a mindful way, there may be an additive effect of training as the two elements of 
the practice (mindfulness and movement) independently, and perhaps synergistically, engage 
common underlying systems (the default mode network). We discuss how working with mindful 
movement may be one route to mindfulness training for individuals who would struggle to sit still 
to complete the more commonly taught mindfulness practices. Drawing on our clinical experience 
working with individuals with severe and enduring mental health conditions, we show the real 
world application of these ideas and how they can be used to help those who are suffering and 
for whom current treatments are still far from adequate.
Keywords: tai chi, mindful movement, default mode network, mindfulness, working memory, attention, psychosis, 
locus coeruleus/adrenaline
introduction
Mindfulness in its modern secular manifestation has been defined as the “the awareness that emerges 
through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally to the unfolding 
of experience” (Kabat-Zinn, 2003, p. 145). This training has its roots in centuries old traditions, yet 
is now delivered in standardized mindfulness training protocols (ST-Mindfulness)1  across a range 
of settings. This training in how to pay attention in a non-reactive, non-judgmental way is now 
well-established as beneficial for those suffering from chronic physical and mental health conditions 
(Fjorback et al., 2011; Williams and Kuyken, 2012; Khoury et al., 2013). However, one outstanding 
question relates to which specific components of this multifaceted intervention are contributing to 
the observed benefits (MacCoon et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2014).
A key training element is repeatedly attending to sensory information from the body. This is done through 
a variety of practices, which can be stationary (e.g., supine body scan) or moving (e.g., slow mindful walking, 
stretching, and yoga). The mindful movement practices may have a particular potency as evidenced by the 
finding that mindful yoga, although completed for the shortest amount of time relative to other practices, 
1 Including mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT).
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had the biggest impact on changes in mindfulness, well-being, 
and medical symptoms (Carmody and Baer, 2008). Mindful 
yoga practice time was also correlated with decreases in negative 
judgment of inner experience. Reduced judgment of inner experi-
ence contributes to changes in perceived stress in health workers 
(Shapiro et al., 2005) and reduced depressive symptoms in chronic 
depression (Kuyken et al., 2010). This indicates a strong rationale 
for mindful movement practices to be implemented more widely.
Most ST-Mindfulness practices require a certain degree of 
endurance in the ability to remain stationary for long periods, 
sometimes up to 45 min. This may be difficult for individuals who 
find it hard to remain seated and focused. Some of the groups who 
might therefore benefit from training based on mindful movement 
include: (i) those for whom the content and quality of mental 
experience is chaotic, disorganized, and distressing (e.g., visual or 
auditory hallucinations, paranoid delusions, racing thoughts and 
suicidal ideation, depersonalization); (ii) those whose illness may 
have compromised their attentional capabilities; (iii) those whose 
neurological or developmental disabilities make the metacognitive 
aspects of the training challenging; (iv) those for whom abnormali-
ties (typically over-activity) in the motor system form part of the 
pathology of the disorder (for example ADHD, Tics, Tourette etc.); 
and (v) any others who find it hard to sit still for a relatively long 
period of time.
Mindful movement is a practice that may be of special relevance 
to those suffering from psychosis (and schizophrenia), an area of 
particular interest and specialization of the authors. High levels 
of stress are observed in these individuals. Not only do stressful 
life events predict relapse, there is also an effect of so-called daily 
hassles on relapse (Gispen-De Wied, 2000). One of the ways of 
coping with stress is to employ strategies. There is evidence that 
psychological interventions that deal with focusing attention and 
gaining control over mental experiences such as auditory hallu-
cinations can reduce distress caused by symptoms (Shergill et al., 
1998; Russell et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2010). However, impaired 
cognitive performance may hamper this effort. There are a small 
number of studies using modified ST-Mindfulness protocols, and 
mindful movement with those experiencing psychosis (Russell, 
2011; Chadwick, 2014), yet the wider delivery of mindfulness to 
these populations is hindered by beliefs that “mindfulness may be 
harmful for this client group” (Chadwick, 2014, p. 333).
In addition, the disorganized motor expression in this popula-
tion has been neglected in current research. Often summarized and 
simplified under the term “agitation,” neuromotor signs are a key 
developmental feature of schizophrenia (Schiffman et al., 2004). 
Psychotic patients often present with severe imbalances in posture, 
co-ordination, and movement refinement before pharmacological 
treatment (Pappa and Dazzan, 2009), reflecting the disturbance of 
homeostasis in both body and mind. A more detailed examina-
tion of mindful movements for this population may thus help to 
advance the understanding of the pathophysiology of psychotic 
phenomena.
In this article, we present an argument for the utility of mindful 
movement as a mindfulness training methodology. We suggest 
some reasons why this training method may be particularly help-
ful for persons with severe and enduring mental conditions who 
struggle with ST-Mindfulness exercises. Our starting point was 
the clinical observation that mindful movements are reported 
by these patients as easier relative to static practices (Russell and 
Tatton-Ramos, 2014). Considering the intensity of their mind-
wandering experience (Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012), we 
have identified some mechanisms that intersect ST-Mindfulness 
training, movement practices, and the clinical picture of psychotic 
patients. These may share neural underpinnings, including those 
brain regions2 that are part of the default mode network (DMN), 
known to be disrupted in schizophrenia (Buckner et  al., 2008; 
Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012).
We are aware that we are proposing novel ways to look at phe-
nomena observed both in mindfulness training and those suffering 
with psychotic symptoms. Our proposal offers some “pieces of a 
bigger puzzle,” with obvious gaps between some of the concepts 
discussed. It is beyond the scope of this article to propose a coher-
ent and tested theory for the complex field of consciousness and its 
disturbances observed in psychosis. However, we believe mindful 
movement is a powerful intervention and it is our intention to open 
avenues for research and clinical work, and further elaborate the 
multiple routes to mindfulness training.
Key aspects of Mindfulness training
A number of papers have proposed mechanisms underlying 
ST-Mindfulness and its effects [Shapiro et al., 2006; Teasdale and 
Chaskalson (Kulananda), 2011; Vago and Silbersweig, 2012], but 
scarce mention is made about these mechanisms with respect to the 
movement practices. While the process of mindfulness training is 
common to stationary and movement practices (paying attention, 
on purpose, moment-by-moment without judgment), the object 
(movement) has some distinct characteristics that may potentiate, 
as well as provide an alternative route to, mindfulness training.
Hasenkamp et al. (2012) defined four distinct phases to capture 
what occurs in the more basic type of meditation training (named 
focused attention): (i) mind-wandering; (ii) awareness of mind-
wandering; (iii) an intentional shift of attention back to the object; 
and (iv) a sustained, focused attention on the object. They have 
suggested that mind-wandering engages the DMN, while the sali-
ence network (SN), and attentional networks/executive regions 
are engaged for the awareness of mind-wandering, the intentional 
shift of attention back to the object, and sustained focused atten-
tion (Hasenkamp et al., 2012). Mindfulness training results in a 
reduction of mind-wandering with a corresponding decrease in 
activation in the DMN (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Pagnoni 
et al., 2008; Brewer et al., 2011).
Broadly speaking therefore, a key task in ST-Mindfulness is 
to monitor and regulate mind-wandering, by means of focusing 
attention on a chosen object. The basic features of this training 
are described in Section “Mind-Wandering.” This process requires 
regulation of the locus coeruleus3 (LC)/noradrenaline (NA)4 
2 The default mode network brain regions include four main areas: medial 
pre-frontal cortex, posterior cingulate and retrosplenial cortex, left and right 
inferior parietal lobule, and an additional region, the medial temporal lobe.
3 The locus coeruleus, a nucleus in the pons (part of the brainstem) is the 
principal site for brain synthesis of noradrenaline.
4 Also referred to as norepinephrine.
table 1 | locus coeruleus firing.
sleep wake cycle mode
awake asleep
lC firing mode tonic phasic tonic
Arousal state Hypervigilant Torpor Variable (partly dependent on tonic) Slow wave REM
Firing pattern/ 
NA level
High/increased Low/decreased Temporarily coupled to task-relevant 
processing
Low/decreased Silent/
decreased
Cognitive/mental  
state
Distractibility Dream-like Focused, selective attention, filtering out 
information that does not pertain to the task
? Dreaming
Patients High tonic at acute states 
(positive symptoms)
More prone to mind-wandering 
(negative symptoms)
Attention deficits, planning deficits, faulty 
filtering
Disturbed sleep
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system (described in Section “Mind-Wandering and the Locus 
Coeruleus/Noradrenaline System”), and engagement of some of 
the components of the working memory system, specifically the 
central executive (CE) and episodic buffer (described in Section 
“Monitoring and Management of Mind-Wandering Requires 
Working Memory”). While these are only some of the components 
engaged in this complex mental training, they are particularly 
relevant here as they are also engaged in the generation and 
execution of movement (described in Section “Movements”). 
Thus, greater elaboration of these features may contribute to a 
further understanding of the mechanisms and effects of mindful 
movement practices. The commonalities between the neurophysi-
ological and neuropsychological aspects of mindfulness training 
and movement, lead to a consideration of the additive effects of 
mindful movement (Section “Mindful Movements”).
Mind-Wandering
Mind-wandering and task focus are often treated as a dichotomy 
(Schad et  al., 2012). When trying to attend to an object, there 
is more opportunity to notice mind-wandering. Although we 
are often largely unaware that we have mentally “wandered 
off,” one study indicates we are in this mode roughly 50% of the 
time (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). The generic term “self-
generated thoughts” has been proposed to capture this type of 
mental activity (Smallwood and Schooler, 2014). Mind-wandering 
can be intentional (e.g., planning, problem-solving, or reflecting), 
non-intentional (habitual), task-related or unrelated, and be of 
the “deep” (totally lost in thought) or “weak” (slight derailment) 
variety (Schad et al., 2012).
When attentional focus on the intended object wavers, there is 
an increased susceptibility to mind-wandering, and attention may 
be high-jacked by task-unrelated thoughts (TUTs). TUTs increase 
engagement with internal experience (including thoughts, images, 
memories) and reduce processing of external environmental events 
(Smallwood, 2013). The expression “lost in thought” describes the 
situation where we are no longer attentive to what is happening in the 
environment and are “up in our heads.” Being lost in thought could 
be a pleasant experience, for example, a daydream about a holiday. 
Alternatively, it may be unpleasant and distressing, for example, 
caught up in endless cycles of ruminative judging. A consequence of 
mindfulness training is an increased ability to recognize and “catch” 
mind-wandering and an improved ability to switch between states 
of mind-wandering and focused attention (Lutz et al., 2008).
Mind-Wandering and the locus Coeruleus/
noradrenaline system
Activity in the LC/NA system has been implicated in the occur-
rence of mind-wandering (as measured by TUTs, 27). The LC is a 
pontine structure, containing the largest number of noradrenergic 
neurons in the brain (Craven et al., 2005). It has extensive corti-
cal projections, including to the pre-frontal cortex (Berridge and 
Waterhouse, 2003; Marien et  al., 2004), an important feature 
which may underpin some of the cognitive effects of activity in 
this system (explained below). Employing two distinct modes 
of firing (phasic and tonic), the LC provides a range of arousal 
levels which optimize performance under different conditions 
(Smallwood et al., 2012). These patterns of firing modulate the 
system from states that are sleepy and dull to those of high arousal 
and excitability (see Table 1).
During awake states, low (tonic) baseline firing levels are associ-
ated with drowsiness and torpor. High tonic baseline firing rates are 
associated with increased arousal and distractibility. Importantly, 
there is an interaction between those two modes (phasic and tonic) 
and the ability to focus attention (Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003). 
In a narrow range of tonic firing, it is possible for the phasic mode 
to occur. This phasic mode modulates the salience of information, 
which directly manipulates the attentional focus.
In the phasic mode, there are brief neuronal discharges within 
the LC. These discharges are coupled with the onset of the cognitive 
processing of task-relevant events, resulting in the amplifica-
tion of the cortical representation of task-relevant information 
(Smallwood et al., 2012). Increased discharge of the LC, results 
in increased NA in the system. Thus, NA has been suggested as 
a chemical modulator of attention (Posner and Rothbart, 2007) 
mediating two functions: (i) the ability to select and attend to 
information that is relevant to the task and (ii) the ability to be 
alert to unexpected task-unrelated events (Craven et al., 2005). 
Such modulation serves an adaptive function and is necessary for 
survival. It facilitates the detection of sensory information relevant 
to a task, making salient (“popping out”) those stimuli that are 
aligned with the intention (see Box 1).
Increased tonic firing of the LC (with the resultant increase 
in NA in the system) disrupts this coupling process. Therefore, 
LC phasic responses become small or absent (Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2005). This decoupling results in an “undifferentiated increase in 
cortical processing” (Smallwood et al., 2012, p. 2), meaning it is 
harder to distinguish between stimuli that are relevant and those 
box 2 | searching for your keys with stress.
Example 2: Leaving home under stressful conditions.
Now imagine, trying to find your keys when you are running late, in a friend’s 
house for the first time (unfamiliar territory), having already set the burglar 
alarm, under time pressure to get out before the alarm goes off. Under these 
conditions (high tonic firing of LC), our ability to search and detect the lost 
keys is compromised. Due to the increased levels of arousal, the possibility 
to match the incoming sensory information with the goal is diminished. You 
have to keep searching and going over the same areas repeatedly because 
of lack of salience (pop out) of the shape, color, or number of keys. This is 
distractibility, with diminished ability to focus attention on what is relevant.
box 1 | searching for your keys without stress – importance of locus 
coeruleus/noradrenaline system.
Example 1: Leaving home under calm conditions.
A common situation in daily life is leaving the house. When approaching the 
door, one realizes that the keys are not in their usual place, and begins to 
search for them.
With the intention to find the keys in mind, features of the desired object are 
drawn from memory (the color of the keys, the number of keys, the turtle 
shape of the key ring etc.) in a way that may be conscious or below conscious 
awareness. These features provide a template for the expected sensory 
information that will indicate the goal (“find keys”) has been met. This template 
helps to filter the wealth of sensory information flooding into the system as you 
move your eyes, turn your head, or move your body to search the room. Any 
sensory information that does not match what is expected (colors “silver” and 
“bronze” associated with “metal,” “small” etc.) is rapidly rejected. It is dimmed 
to the attentional system and the neural traces of information corresponding 
to these irrelevant items decays.
When there is a match between the expected and observed information (you 
see a turtle-shaped object) this is highly salient, you pay extra attention and go 
in for a closer look. This enhanced, focused attention allows you to reach your 
goal – you have found the keys!
In this case, the phasic mode of firing within LC allows the coupling of relevant 
information, giving salience to the searched sensory stimuli (e.g., silver, turtle 
shape) and dimming irrelevant information (e.g., another set of keys).
This system must be flexible enough to permit unforeseen situations. While 
you are searching for your keys, you may come across something that cap-
tures your attention outside of the current goal. For example, you notice that 
the cat’s water bowl is empty. Depending on the relevance of this observation 
(how much you like your cat or how long you will be gone from the house), 
this sensory information may generate an alarm signal, which has the potential 
to disrupt the on-going task (find keys) and start a new one (fill water bowl).
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that are not, nothing is “highlighted” or prioritized in terms of 
the attentional system (see Box 2). With increased NA activity, 
distractibility is thus magnified (Coull, 1994).
In mindfulness training, the task is to attend to the present 
moment (for example, attending to bodily sensations). The task 
requires an optimum state of “alert relaxation,” with the student 
monitoring the level of arousal. The student is also instructed to 
focus attention on specific information (e.g., sensations arising 
from the body). Mind-wandering occurs: (i) when distractibility 
is high and it is hard to keep the focus of attention and (ii) when 
in a more relaxed state, stimuli from the outside world become 
dimmed and the mind is carried away by thoughts, images, and 
dream-like states, leading to torpor.
In terms of the LC/NA system, these would respectively cor-
respond to higher or lower tonic modes [outside the narrow range 
that allows the phasic bursts to occur (Berridge and Waterhouse, 
2003)]. In both these situations, there would be a decoupling of the 
transient bursts, which are necessary to keep the body sensations 
salient. This means other task-unrelated information becomes 
equally salient. In mindfulness training, the detection of mind-
wandering is a cue to renew the intention to attend to the object 
of choice.
As proposed by Hasenkamp et al. (2012), meditation training 
in focused attention requires the student to become aware of 
mind-wandering, to shift attention away from it, and to re-focus 
on the intended object. According to this description, selec-
tion of the incoming stimuli (body sensations as distinct from 
a range of other stimuli) should be temporally coupled with 
the intended goal (“attend to the body”). This would require 
modulation of the LC/NA system. One suggestion is that phasic 
activity would be coupled to the sensory information related to 
the task (e.g., sensations arising from the body). Coupled LC 
discharges (and corresponding NA bursts) with body sensations 
would then result in these becoming amplified, and all other 
sensations (e.g., the thought that captured attention and took 
us off task) dimmed.
The sections above have described the putative neurophysiologi-
cal underpinnings important for mindfulness training, describing 
how the different modes of LC/NA firing relate to states of arousal, 
mind-wandering, and focused attention. From a cognitive point 
of view, in focused attention meditation practices three skills are 
required: (i) monitoring and vigilance to distractors whilst main-
taining the focus of attention on an object; (ii) prompt disengage-
ment or release from distractors; and (iii) deliberate re-focusing 
of attention back to the chosen object (Lutz et al., 2008). In the 
following sections, we describe the cognitive model which enables 
these distinct and complex functions required for ST-Mindfulness, 
via processes that have been ascribed to the CE and episodic buffer 
components of the working memory system (Baddeley, 1986).
Monitoring and Management of Mind-Wandering 
requires Working Memory
Working memory (and specifically its CE component) plays a key 
role in keeping clear priorities in the face of potential distractions 
(De Fockert, 2013). Therefore, during ST-Mindfulness, in order to 
keep the focus of attention whilst dealing with mind-wandering, 
such a system is very likely to be employed. A number of authors 
have implicated working memory in mindfulness training (Vago 
and Silbersweig, 2012) and its suggested therapeutic effects 
[Kerr et al., 2011; Teasdale and Chaskalson (Kulananda), 2011]. 
Experimental studies with both children (Schonert-Reichl 
et  al., 2015) and adults (Jha et  al., 2010; Mrazek et  al., 2013) 
point to improvements in working memory capacity measured 
by neuropsychological tests following ST-Mindfulness. Under 
stressful conditions, short duration mindfulness training appears 
to reduce the deleterious effects of stress on working memory 
(Banks et al., 2015).
The term “working memory” falls within the broader construct 
of “executive functions,” defined by Luria [cited by Shallice (1982)] 
box 3 | Five instances when it might be necessary to bring conscious 
attention to a motor task.
i) new movements
ii) movements in dangerous situations
iii) movements requiring planning or decision making
iv) movements requiring troubleshooting or correction
v) movements requiring overcoming habitual responses
*Note that all movements require planning/decision making and troubleshooting/
correcting and that this does not need conscious awareness but conscious 
awareness can be brought to these aspects of the system.
May 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 2825
Russell and Arcuri Clinical mindful movement
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org
as a specialized system for the programing, regulation, and veri-
fication of activity involving the frontal lobes. More recently, the 
terms control, inhibition, and monitoring are used to describe 
these key executive functions. In mindfulness training, attention 
and working memory functions share common features (Buttle, 
2011). There are also many overlaps between attentional and 
working memory systems in the brain (Nobre et al., 2004; Buttle, 
2011; Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012). This can create confusion and 
a lack of specificity in the use of the term “working memory” 
(Vago and Silbersweig, 2012) may hinder research (Raz and Buhle, 
2006).
The centrality of working memory in behavior (D’Esposito and 
Postle, 2015) and cognitive control (D’Esposito and Postle, 2015) 
has been demonstrated in research spanning over 50 years in the 
fields of experimental psychology and neuropsychology, as well 
as clinically. Although models of working memory continue to 
be refined and developed, we believe the specificity of the mul-
ticomponent model of working memory proposed by Baddeley 
and Hitch (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986) may 
provide a useful framework to help develop and refine cognitive 
models of mindfulness training [Shapiro et al., 2006; Teasdale and 
Chaskalson (Kulananda), 2011; Vago and Silbersweig, 2012]. This 
robust model has survived extensive experimental testing over 
many decades (Baddeley, 2002, 2012).
Within Baddeley’s framework, working memory comprises a 
CE with three auxiliary (slave) systems including the phonological 
loop, the visuo-spatial scratchpad (VSSP)5, and the episodic buffer. 
Baddeley has stated that “the episodic buffer can be accessed by 
the CE via the medium of conscious awareness” (Baddeley, 2000, 
p. 421), making these two parts of this model particularly relevant 
to mindfulness training.
The CE co-ordinates information processing with the help of 
these auxiliary systems. Baddeley described CE as “an attentional 
control system with no intrinsic storage capacity” (Baddeley, 2000, 
p. 420). It maintains intention (goals), monitors conflict, has a 
number of attentional roles (switching between tasks, focused 
attention, and divided attention) and interacts (via the auxiliary 
systems) with long-term memory. All these activities are coordi-
nated to keep us “on task.” In ST-Mindfulness training, the CE is 
proposed to play a role in maintaining the overarching intention 
(e.g., “present moment awareness”) and to guide the attentional 
system (e.g., “attend to breath”).
The episodic buffer is described as a limited capacity, tempo-
rary, multimodal, storage system, which is at the interface between 
long-term memory and both the VSSP and phonological loop 
slave systems (Baddeley, 2000). The term “episodic” refers to a 
mode of operating, in which information is gathered together 
to form “chunks” or “episodes.” The term “buffer” refers to the 
characteristics of this system to maintain information tempo-
rarily on-line in order to manipulate it, transforming different 
types of information from a variety of systems into a common 
multidimensional code.
5 The VSSP integrates visuospatial information from multiple sources 
including visual, tactile, and kinesthetic, and from both episodic and 
semantic long-term memory.
Thus, when performing mindfulness training, we propose 
it is the CE which allows us to become “conscious aware” (as 
Baddeley describes it) of the contents stored in the episodic 
buffer (breath or not breath, the latter being mind-wandering) 
and to reallocate attentional resources back to the intended goal 
(breath).
To summarize, mindfulness training develops the ability to 
modulate between states of alertness and sleepiness, and the 
capacity to monitor mind-wandering and focus attention. It 
develops cognitive “top-down” control over mind-wandering and 
focused attention via the CE of the working memory system. It also 
engages the episodic buffering function to hold on-line multimodal 
information and allow it to be manipulated in the service of higher 
order intentions (and behavioral control).
In addition to the role of working memory, in Section “Key 
Aspects of Mindfulness Training,” we have highlighted how the 
regulation of the LC/NA system is associated with mind-wan-
dering which can interfere with the manipulation of attentional 
focus. We thus suggest that these two aspects are crucial to a 
better understanding of the mechanisms underlying the training 
of the focus of attention required in mindfulness meditation. In 
the following sections, we review evidence that moving the body 
engages these same systems (LC/NA and WM). What follows is 
not an exhaustive review of the motor sciences literature, rather 
we point to areas of overlap between motor movements and 
mindfulness training.
Movements
General Cognitive aspects of Movement
A topic of long-standing interest to researchers studying both 
attention and movement is the variable ways in which attention can 
be brought to action, and the discovery that it is possible to attend 
to movement in a variety of ways and at different levels of conscious 
awareness (Norman and Shallice, 1986; Frith, 2002). Norman 
and Shallice (1986) model of the supervisory attentional system 
(SAS) aimed “to produce an explanation for the different types 
of experience one can have of an action” (p. 14). They described 
five instances where it might be necessary to bring attention to a 
motor task (see Box 3). In such situations, the SAS, interacting 
with attention, selects and co-ordinates the desired response motor 
sequence (Badgaiyan, 2000). Baddeley integrated the SAS into his 
working memory model, naming it the CE (Baddeley, 2012). It 
is the same mechanism, with two different names. It is a control 
system that can be used to manipulate the contents of working 
box 4 | automatic correction of automatic movements.
A highly automated program to walk forwards in a straight line can be carried 
out whilst doing many other tasks such as talking to a friend or looking 
elsewhere. We can execute these walking, talking, and looking motor com-
mands automatically without allocating any attention to the motor elements.
Imagine that you are walking, with your head turned, attention elsewhere. You 
do not notice there is an obstacle (a rubbish bag) directly in your path. Before 
you are even consciously aware of the hazard, it is likely that your body will 
correct or modify the movement, allowing you to jump over or side-step the 
bag. Only after the movement has been corrected, we realize there was an 
obstacle. This conscious awareness has come much too late to modify the 
movement via controlled means.
Having had this experience, we might in future be more “mindful” when 
walking and talking to our friend. This everyday term reflects the element of 
attention that we bring to situations that might be dangerous, most famously 
heard on the London Underground (“Mind the gap”).
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memory storage in order to guide behavior in an effective way and 
particularly so when flexible responding is required (D’Esposito 
and Postle, 2015).
Automatic and Controlled Movement
The majority of movements made are highly automated and do not 
require any attention at all. Even a complex movement, like driving, 
can be done with little overt attention to the task (i.e., automati-
cally). In this example, the mind is free to wander. However, it is 
possible to shift between automatic and controlled modes (in both 
directions). We argue that this process of shifting is inherent within 
the motor system, and in ST-Mindfulness occurs within an abstract 
mental realm. In ST-Mindfulness training, there is an intention to 
observe and undo habitual (automatic) mental reactivity in order 
to create new, healthier habits of responding (Kang et al., 2012). 
Thus, being able to shift between the automatic and controlled 
modes, via engagement of attention is important when training 
mindfulness. Moreover, this is also an intrinsic element of motor 
behavior, particularly when learning a new motor skill. The three-
stage theory of motor learning proposes that after passing through 
the “cognitive” and “association” stages, we reach a third “automatic” 
stage (Fitts and Posner, 1967). In this automatic stage, the motor 
skill is so well-established that it can be performed automatically in 
a range of contexts with limited demands on attentional resources 
(as with the driving example above).
Shifting back into controlled mode (from automatic) can occur 
under a variety of circumstances (see Box 3) and with varying 
levels of awareness. This might be required if you were deliberately 
trying to reverse a habitual way of moving (for example, un-doing a 
bad habit you had picked up in your golf swing). Another example 
of shifting between these modes is when you encounter something 
dangerous in the environment, which requires a rapid modifica-
tion of the movement, correcting the movement, the posture, 
and perhaps shifting back the intention. In this case, an alerting 
signal is provided by the system, something that may occur either 
without awareness or with delayed awareness. Box 4 shows how 
the movement program has been modified by unexpected external 
circumstances some time before a conscious awareness of the need 
to modify the movement takes place. Ullsperger et al. (2010) have 
speculated that we are not aware of the error-detection, but rather 
become aware of the subsequent arousal response in the system.
Prediction and Anticipation in Movement
Information processing models (combining ideas from computer 
sciences and observations from physiology) detail how this process 
of rapid correction occurs. “It is now generally accepted that when 
we execute a movement we predict the sensory consequences of that 
movement through generative or forward models (…) predicted kin-
ematics from motor commands are considered an integral part of motor 
execution” (Kilner et al., 2007, p. 161). The term corollary discharge 
(also called “efference copy”) describes the “copy” or “template” of 
the predicted movement discharged into the system at the same time 
as the efferent motor command. This efference copy is drawn from 
stored memories of motor commands and their sensory consequences 
(Blakemore et al., 2001) and provides an internal representation of 
the expected sensory consequences of the movement.
The observed visual and proprioceptive sensations entering the 
system during the movement are compared against this efference 
copy on a moment-by-moment basis. This determines if the 
movement has been executed as intended (Jeannerod, 2003). If 
the observed sensory input (the reafferent signal) matches the 
efference copy, the movement has been conducted as planned, 
and there is no need to allocate attention. This process has been 
suggested as a way to increase the efficiency of attention and 
cognitive processing, by preventing the central nervous system 
from wasting valuable metabolic resources processing irrelevant 
(self-generated) sensory stimuli and maximizing the detection of 
the more important unanticipated or unpredicted stimuli (Pynn 
and DeSouza, 2013). In these latter cases (see Box 4), there is a 
mismatch between expected and observed sensory information, 
creating an error signal, and alerting the system to do something to 
modify the movement. In any movement, the mismatches are more 
salient. The error signal triggers a cascade of events including those 
that will reconfigure muscle activity, joint orientation, and velocity 
as well as top-down mechanisms to re-organize the movement 
sequence. Part of this process may involve bringing the source 
of the discrepancy into focus. This is an important feature of the 
motor system with survival value.
Environmental demands as well as changing internal goals mean 
we need to anticipate, predict, and process in parallel information 
related to our movements on a moment-by-moment basis. No 
matter whether the movement is well-practiced (highly automatic) 
or brand new, the brain creates simulations to anticipate the various 
stages of the movement, and the state of sensory receptors, in order 
to foresee possible solutions to every error, take chances, and make 
decisions (Berthoz, 1997).
The possibility to anticipate movements in the way described 
above may engage a type of simulation architecture that has been 
evoked in discussions of mind-wandering and the DMN. As 
Buckner has stated “there may be specialized brain systems that 
underlie our abilities to mentally explore and anticipate future 
situations” (Buckner et al., 2008, p. 31). Berthoz has also pointed 
to the importance of simulation in movement physiology and 
Jeannerod’s work proposes a simulation hypothesis of motor 
cognition that underpins action representation, social cognition, 
and language understanding (Jeannerod, 2006). Although more 
box 5 | pianist playing solo at a live classical music concert.
The pianist has a repertoire of well-prepared, highly practiced movements. 
These include sequences of whole body movements, foot movements, 
and more complex finger movements. These are well-learned movements. 
However, each live concert brings a unique set of circumstances, which is 
the combination of the sounds produced by the entire orchestra, unfolding 
over time. The pianist must not only play his part, but also “insert” it (the 
solo) within a wider context (an on-going orchestral piece). On the basis of 
this sensory information (primarily auditory but which may also include the 
conductors physical movements), the soloist needs to execute his actions 
(commencement of playing his part). In order to do it correctly, the pianist 
must integrate, with precise timing, the sensory information (music) with the 
movements he is executing to play his part. This coupling of sensory incoming 
information temporarily linked to the goal (planned movements to play the 
piano solo) requires the LC/NA system.
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research is needed to clarify whether these motor and cognitive 
simulation systems are the same, from a philosophical point of 
view6, they appear to represent the same phenomena that “the 
brain is continuously and unconsciously learning to anticipate the 
consequences of action or activity on itself, on the world and on other 
people” (Timmermans et al., 2012, p. 1412).
In summary, motor learning models indicate how movement 
sequences can be highly automatic or fully conscious. Cognitive 
models suggest how movement commands interface with the 
attentional system to change our experience of an action under 
different conditions. Information processing models suggest how 
internal movement representations support flexible responding. 
The feedforward model is proposed to do this by predicting what 
we might expect to experience and then comparing this with the 
actual experience. In this latter system, an error-detection/alert-
ing signal is activated when there is a mismatch that may have 
potential survival value. These error correction mechanisms in 
the movement system may rely on the same neurophysiological 
(LC/NA) and neuropsychological (WM) as we describe below.
neurophysiological aspects of Movement: lC/na
The noradrenergic system is implicated in the physiology of move-
ments; both the autonomic aspects of movements and the more 
cognitive aspects.
Movement requires autonomic adjustments, such as changes in 
arterial blood-pressure or volume and LC–NA neuronal activity 
is highly sensitive to cardiovascular events (Elam et al., 1986b). 
Additionally, during movement, there are an increased number and 
variety of tactile sensations (cutaneous sensory afferents), which 
feed into the LC (Elam et al., 1986a,b). These afferents include those 
arising from the skin stretching over muscles and the sensation 
of the air or clothes moving across the skin. Thus, movements 
are likely to impact on LC–NA firing rates, via modulation of 
cardiovascular and sensory afferents.
Any system that monitors salience must be intimately connected 
to the movement system in order to ensure that the animal survives 
when it detects something threatening, requiring it to escape from 
danger (Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003). This suggestion is sup-
ported by Bortoletto’s observation (Bortoletto et  al., 2011) that 
arousal does not directly activate structures underlying the prepara-
tion for actions, but rather influences the allocation of attentional 
resources to movement. As suggested in Section “Mind-Wandering 
and the Locus Coeruleus/Noradrenaline System,” the phasic mode 
of LC firing supports task-relevant information processing and 
selective attention. It has been suggested that the output of LC 
activity may “coordinately regulate the speed and efficiency of motor 
responses to salient stimuli” (Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003, p. 61). 
The neuroanatomical and neurophysiological properties of the LC 
(Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003) make it suitable for signaling the 
detection of unexpected state changes (Dayan and Yu, 2006) and 
triggering the required rapid behavioral adaptation to an environ-
ment that is constantly changing (Bouret and Sara, 2005; Dayan 
and Yu, 2006) (see example in Box 5). The error signal (“mismatch” 
6 This is a large philosophical area of debate encompassing enacted cogni-
tion and embodiment that is outside the scope of this paper.
in the feedforward model, described above) is a salient marker 
of an unexpected change in the environment, which may prompt 
modulation of the LC/NA system.
Although the exact mechanism by which the LC/NA system 
modulates movements has not yet been fully elucidated, it is likely 
an important neuromodulator, with the caveat that this system 
likely interacts with other neurotransmitters, such as dopamine.
neuropsychological aspects of Movement: 
Working Memory
The error correction process within the motor system has been 
suggested to imply a short-term storage of outflow information 
(Jeannerod, 1997), a function which could be subserved by the 
episodic buffer of working memory. We suggest these expected 
and observed sensory consequences are held, to be manipulated, 
within the episodic buffer system. The episodic buffer can hold 
multimodal information including representations drawn up from 
long-term memory (as would be necessary to hold all the different 
sorts information stored in relation to movements).
Working memory and movement programing share com-
mon processes, as indicated by studies where working memory 
demands have been increased, causing interference in the motor 
behavior. Increasing working memory load interferes with 
movement preparatory processes that involve cognitive control, 
suggesting that there is a shared resource for working memory 
and movement planning (Baker et al., 2011). Experiments that 
have explored the capacity of the VSSP under different arm move-
ment conditions demonstrate that there is an overlap between 
the movement and the operation of this slave system (Quinn and 
Ralston, 1986). In both these studies, the effects were distinct 
from the effects of the experimental manipulations on attention.
Working memory is considered to play a role in the execution of 
motor programs that require discrete timing. Making a slow move-
ment as we do in mindfulness requires more working memory 
as demonstrated by experiments showing that loading working 
memory interferes with slow, discrete movements more than it 
does with continuous, fast paced movements (Maes et al., 2015).
These findings described above would predict that movements 
requiring attention (engaging the WM system) will impact on 
mind-wandering. Teasdale et  al. (1995) conducted a number 
of experiments to determine the relationship between working 
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memory (specifically the CE) and a type of mind-wandering 
referred to as stimulus-independent thoughts (SITs). In a visuo-
motor task, the production of SITs was reduced when learning 
the task. This effect was seen to a lesser degree once the task had 
been practiced. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that the production of SITs and the control and co-ordination of 
movements share (and compete for) the same limit CE resources.
In terms of possible treatment implications, Teasdale et al. (1995) 
suggest that “the most effective tasks to block unwanted thoughts are 
those that make continuous demands on the control and co-ordinating 
resources of the CE, but, that do not, themselves, generate SITs” (p. 
558). This suggests that new movements, requiring attention, are 
able to interrupt mind-wandering processes. Mind-wandering 
can also be reduced with mindful movements, whereby focused 
attention is deliberately brought to any movement, including 
automatic ones. This finding is congruent with reports that there 
is a decreased in the DMN activity (and thus a possibility to reduce 
mind-wandering) when working memory is increased (Koshino 
et al., 2014). The critical point is the engagement of attention whilst 
moving. This is described in more detail below.
Mindful Movements
Both movements and mindfulness engage wide-ranging brain net-
works that modulate arousal, activity, attention, and monitoring. 
Neuroimaging research suggests many overlaps between regions 
engaged during movement and those used for working memory 
and selective attention, including a fronto-parietal circuit (Harding 
et  al., 2014) which is also activated in movement sequencing 
(Rushworth et  al., 2001; Bengtsson et  al., 2004), motor timing 
(Bortoletto et al., 2011), motor preparation (Collins et al., 2010), 
and motor learning (Jueptner et al., 1997).
Movement alone is sufficient to engage WM and the LC/NA 
system, due to the obvious “change” in sensory information that 
can be observed (e.g., posture, balance, co-ordination, speed) 
creating elements that can become the focus of attention. There 
are a number of contemplative movement practices of Eastern 
origin (e.g., Tai Chi, Chi Gong, Yoga) and also Western somatic 
education methods (e.g., Feldenkrais, Eutonia) that promote, via 
their somatic focus and slow speed, mindful states (a moment-
by-moment felt sense of the body). These have been referred to 
as “movement-based contemplative practices” (Schmalzl et al., 
2014). Some of these have well-recognized physical (Jahnke 
et  al., 2010) and mental (Wang et  al., 2010, 2014; Payne and 
Crane-Godreau, 2013) health benefits and there is a growing 
interest in their ability to promote mindfulness (Nedeljkovic 
et al., 2012).
During a slow movement, the flood of sensory information 
becomes apparent. It is possible to feel the air across the surface 
of the body through sensory receptors, the movement of the joints 
via proprioceptive input, and notice how autonomic responses 
(e.g., breathing and heart rate) are constantly being adjusted. This 
increased sensory information increases the perceptual load on 
the system (as there are more sensations to observe). The extensive 
literature on load theory suggests that a consequence of this is 
decreased distractibility (Lavie et al., 2004). The ability to process 
distractors is related to working memory capacity, when this is 
increased it enhances the ability to deal with distractors promptly. 
Therefore, the ability to attend, and stay attentive, may be easier 
during movement (see Carmody and Baer, 2008).
However, in order for a movement to be considered part 
of “ST-Mindfulness training,” i.e., training with the benefits of 
reducing stress and transforming automatic reactivity into adap-
tive responding, there is an additional cognitive element required. 
Contemplative movement practices tend not to deliberately engage 
the cognitive training elements (awareness of attention to the object 
or lack thereof). Specific guidance is required to bring attention 
to mind-wandering and the cognitive elements used to manage 
mind-wandering.
It is possible to do a movement and train in mindfulness simul-
taneously, using the moving body as the object of focused attention 
training. Recently mindful movement has been defined as “any 
movement conducted with full explicit awareness of intention, 
attention, and all the physical and mental sensations unfolding over 
time. Mindful movements are conducted with a stance of compas-
sionate acceptance toward each and every experience including 
thoughts, feelings, memories, and emotions but especially bodily 
sensations” (Russell and Tatton-Ramos, 2014, p. 120).
When conducting a movement in mindful way, it is suggested 
that there may be additive effects arising from the double engage-
ment of the systems trained in ST-Mindfulness via the movement 
programing and execution aspects and the focused attention/
cognitive aspects, detailed in Table 2.
A critical skill developed in mindfulness training is the ability to 
observe experiences (sensory information, thoughts, emotions), as 
they unfold. The student is asked to monitor sensations from body 
and mind, on a moment-by-moment basis. The working memory 
system (via CE and EB components) supports the monitoring 
of this constantly updated information. Similarly, the temporal 
ordering required to execute a movement, and process sensations 
coming back into the system, uses the same monitoring function 
and the same working memory system. Therefore, mindful move-
ments have a dual entry point to engage the monitoring function 
of the working memory system (Maes et al., 2015).
Another task in mindfulness training is to hold on-line and keep 
track of the “intention.” The student needs to keep an active inten-
tion to pay attention, to monitor mental and physical experiences, 
and stay on task. For example, monitoring whether we are on task 
(attending to a movement) or not (thinking about dinner). There 
is a parallel process in the movement system. Jeannerod (2003) 
proposed that movement “requires not only the simulation of the 
whole action and its consequence in the external world, but also the 
monitoring of the intention-related signals” (p. 162). Movements 
require the on-going monitoring of the efferent motor commands 
and afferent sensory signals to ensure the movement is going as 
intended (Blakemore and Decety, 2001). Therefore, intentionality is 
embedded within any volitional movement (Jeannerod, 2003). Here, 
we again see that mindful movements may have a dual entry point 
into the working memory system via the monitoring of the intention.
Clinical populations
In the state of mind-wandering, Berthoz and Petit have suggested 
that “rather than fixing its gaze in the facts of the world, the subject 
is focused on mere representations. All mental states are already 
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there, peacefully juxtaposed along the one and only homogenous 
plane of ‘Mind’ ” (Berthoz, 1997, p. 14). Although it has been sug-
gested that mind-wandering may have an adaptive function in 
the pursuit of long-term goals (Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 
2013), this system can be engaged in maladaptive/pathological 
ways. In the clinical setting, extreme mind-wandering in the form 
of ruminations and recriminations is not peaceful, and can be 
experienced as distressing. We have discussed how modulation 
of LC firing is implicated in mind-wandering. The involvement 
of this system in psychiatric conditions is suggested by the clinical 
picture of many disorders (Yamamoto and Hornykiewicz, 2004; 
Yamamoto et al., 2014). For example, in individuals with bipolar, 
there are high levels of arousal and anxiety and correspondingly 
high distractibility and poor attention (Thompson et  al., 2005; 
Kung et  al., 2010). In generalized anxiety states, the ability to 
imagine and rehearse future scenarios is over-used and sometimes 
overwhelming (anticipatory anxiety). In depression, firing rates 
table 2 | distinctive guidance points between contemplative and 
mindful movements.
Main 
mindfulness 
instruction
General guidance points Contemplative 
movement
Mindful 
movement
Awareness of 
sensations
Bodily sensations as objects 
for the attention (sensations 
related to autonomic response, 
skeletal and muscular aspects, 
pressure, tactile and visceral, 
proprioception, kinematics)
√ √
Awareness of  
the present 
moment (PM)
PM attributes of body, 
movement sensations, and 
breath
Implicit √
PM attribute of mental 
experience, e.g., emphasis 
on staying with the present 
moment (not getting lost in  
past or future thinking)
Not usually
Awareness of 
attention
Deliberate awareness of the 
ways in which to move, shift, 
narrow, and widen the focus  
of attention to aspects of  
body and movement. 
Commentary on the quality 
of the attention (vivid, dull, 
agitated, stable, striving)
Not usually √
Awareness of 
mind-wandering
Acknowledgment and 
suggested management  
of mind-wandering
Not usually √
Awareness of 
intention (on 
purpose)
Purposeful, deliberate 
engagement with the  
intention to move the body,  
pay attention, be present, 
mindful
Can be (e.g., Tai 
Chi, Feldenkrais, 
continuum 
movement)
√
Awareness of 
non-judgment
A deliberate attitude of 
acceptance and gentleness 
to mental and physical 
phenomena. For example, 
psychological responses to 
learning new movements 
(frustration, elation, irritation, 
pride)
Implicit and in 
relation to the 
physical body 
rather than the 
mind
√
are low, leading to the clinical signs of reduced physical activity. 
Most psychiatric conditions have some pattern of disrupted sleep 
supporting the notion of LC abnormalities. In Table 1, a summary 
of the different modes of LC firing is shown with reference to what 
occurs in patient populations.
For a clinician interacting with psychotic patients, it is often 
difficult to define whether their experience is, at that moment, 
a hallucination (aberrant sensory processing), a delusion (aber-
rant thought processing), or both. At the physiological level, the 
boundaries between perception and belief are considered to be 
less distinct, with both being dependent on prediction. Confusion 
can arise when there is a failure to update inferences and beliefs 
about the world, arising from a discrepancy between predicted 
and observed sensations. This has been offered as an account of 
hallucinations and delusions (Fletcher and Frith, 2009). In the 
motor domain, this manifests as passivity phenomena (where 
self-generated actions are attributed to others). Reinforcing the 
importance of the brain’s capacity to predict and compare con-
stantly updated information, Berthoz, who has worked primarily 
in the field of locomotion physiology, suggests hallucinations 
may be a type of “waking dream,” in which internal circuits that 
are used to simulate the consequences of action are functioning 
autonomously (Berthoz, 1997). Clinically, this corresponds to the 
observation of patients in psychotic states who appear to be living 
as if in an “internal scene.”
This reality distortion (Liddle, 1987) may be due to a disturbance 
in the capacity of the brain to simulate and hold on-line a version of 
reality, with a failure to update information at a suitable pace and 
with a specific temporal order. The confusion between perceptions 
resultant from imagined scenarios and those from the external 
world may arise from over-activity in DMN (Buckner et al., 2008). 
Abnormal functional and structural connectivity between brain 
regions are considered a core feature of schizophrenia, with hyper-
connectivity in the DMN seen in these patients (Whitfield-Gabrieli 
and Ford, 2012). This hyper-connectivity has been proposed to 
result in a propensity to be overly self-referential, poor cognition 
(working memory, executive functions), and poor social cognitive 
performance (Buckner et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009). The latter 
includes the ability to simulate or hold “in mind” the mental states 
of others, a critical skill for social interactions, known as theory 
of mind.
Below, two key neurophysiological and neuropsychological 
deficits seen in psychotic patients are further explored to provide 
an understanding of why mindful movements are helpful when 
working with this population and why adaptations are needed 
(the latter detailed in Section “Clinical Application of Mindful 
Movement: A Description of a Practical Experience with Psychotic 
Patients”).
impaired lC/na and WM Functioning in patients
Patients with schizophrenia are known to be highly distracted 
(Chapman, 1956; Hemsley, 1976) and with defective filtering 
mechanisms (Saccuzzo and Braff, 1986). These impairments in 
information processing may reflect disturbances in the noradr-
energic system. Although a number of neurotransmitters are 
implicated in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, there is 
growing evidence that disruption in the noradrenergic system 
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is a key contributor (Lieberman and Koreen, 1993; Yamamoto 
and Hornykiewicz, 2004; Craven et al., 2005; Lechin and van der 
Dijs, 2005). There are correlations between increased levels of NA 
and relapse in these patients (Van Kammen, 1991), which appear 
to be independent of medication effects (Van Kammen et  al., 
2014). Also, evidence has been found for increased central NA 
output (Friedman et al., 1999), elevated cerebral spinal fluid-NA 
associated with states of over-arousal (Kemali et al., 1990), and 
dysfunction of NA receptors in pre-frontal cortex associated with 
cognitive impairments in these patients (Friedman et al., 1999).
As discussed previously, modulation of the LC/NA system 
is associated with different ways to process incoming sensory 
information. Thus, high tonic levels of LC firing are associated 
with decoupling of the NA bursts from salient stimuli, resulting 
in poor discriminability and increased distractibility (Smallwood 
et al., 2012). It has been suggested that boosting of task-irrelevant 
signals (high tonic mode) increases “the conscious expression of 
intentional thoughts that are not directly related to the current 
task” (Smallwood et al., 2012, p. 2). With this firing pattern, there 
is a reduction in perceptual input from external sources, and the 
individual may be absorbed in their own internal experience. 
This description corresponds to clinical observations of psychotic 
patients, lost in their own mental experience, who are also some-
times incapable of determining whether information is arising from 
an internal or external source (as is the case with hallucinations). 
Thus, one interpretation is that the natural tendency to mind-
wander is amplified in these patients due to the high tonic firing 
rate of the LC. Furthermore, abnormal P300 (also called P3) has 
been described as one of the most robust markers of schizophrenia 
(McCarley et al., 1993). P300 is an evoked potential signal that 
occurs after novel and task-relevant stimuli have been processed. 
It is considered an electrophysiological correlate of the LC phasic 
response mode (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). These findings point 
to defective phasic modulation of NA in the LC in schizophrenia, 
in addition to the tonic abnormalities.
From a neuropsychological perspective, working memory 
deficits are a key feature of schizophrenia (Goldman-Rakic, 1994; 
Forbes et al., 2009) and a target for treatment (Lett et al., 2015). 
Working memory difficulties are even more pronounced in those 
with formal thought disorder, who show particularly striking 
decrements on tasks assessing both VSSP and verbal components 
of the working memory system (Arcuri, 2003; Arcuri et al., 2010). 
Clinicians struggle to support these patients adequately, as psy-
chological treatments often require the very cognitive abilities that 
are impaired. This may also preclude ST-Mindfulness, as these 
practices require working memory.
Making the Case for training Mindfulness with 
patients Using Mindful Movement
In the previous sections, we have described two mechanisms, one 
neurophysiological (LC/NA system) and one neuropsychological 
(WM) implicated in the ST-Mindfulness training (and focused 
attention training). We have also described the involvement of 
these two mechanisms in movements, and particularly in mindful 
movements. We further pointed to evidence of impairment of these 
same mechanisms in psychotic patients, and the resultant implica-
tions for using ST-Mindfulness static practices with these groups. 
On this basis, it is clear why ST-Mindfulness may be difficult and/or 
unsuitable for patients with psychosis. These observations can help 
inform theory-driven adaptations for the delivery of mindfulness 
training, allowing these individuals to benefit from mindfulness, 
delivered via another route: mindful movement. Before we describe 
our experience of doing this work, we summarize the rationale for 
why we believe this method works.
In psychosis, there is an extreme level of mind-wandering 
(patients are highly distracted). When using movements as the 
object of attentional training for mindfulness, you are engag-
ing the same brain architecture (anticipation/simulation) as is 
engaged in mind-wandering states. This, we suggest, leaves less 
room for positive symptoms as the mind-wandering “machinery” 
is occupied with movement preparation and execution. At the 
neural level, mindful movements in those with high distractibility 
possibly facilitates the switching away from the DMN and toward 
attentional/executive and SNs.
Awareness generally is problematic for these patients, most 
likely due to impairments in the CE/EB system. The concrete, 
physical sense of movements and their timing properties (a begin-
ning, middle, and end of a movement) provide strong anchors 
against which to detect mind-wandering. It is easier to detect the 
difference between a concrete and an abstract sensations (move-
ment sensation versus an inner voice) as compared to two abstract 
sensations (a thought and an inner voice). With respect to the tim-
ing aspect, it is easy to become aware that your mind has wandered 
off during a movement because a very obvious portion of a defined 
movement sequence would have been completely missed (escaped 
your attention) while you were “gone.” With supportive guidance 
from the facilitator (shown in Table 3), awareness of general mind-
wandering (e.g., thoughts about dinner) and symptom-specific 
mind-wandering (e.g., auditory hallucinations) can be trained. The 
differentiation between the target of attention (movement) and the 
distractors (“normal” mind-wandering and/or the more extreme 
symptom-specific mind-wandering) is made easier as it does not 
rely solely on engagement and monitoring of the internal world.
In psychotic patients, WM and LC abnormalities may present 
as a difficulty in holding on-line the intention to pay attention, 
holding on-line the intention to monitor, shift, and direct attention, 
and problems with goal-directed movements. When completing 
slow mindful movements, it is easier to shift attention back to 
the movement because it is being conducted in a controlled way 
(which requires attention) rather than automatically. In terms of 
the intentional shift back to the object, in mindfulness training, this 
is usually held “in mind” by the individual, but in psychotic patients 
this needs to be done via guidance. The guidance of the facilitator 
supports the working memory deficits (perhaps functioning as an 
external, auxiliary, working memory system).
Psychotic patients have high distractibility and problems in 
maintaining a sustained, focused attention on any object. It has been 
suggested above that this may be related to the reported abnormali-
ties in the LC/NA system. Specifically, we suggested that high tonic 
LC firing rates are linked to high levels of arousal (which makes 
paying attention difficult) as well as phasic firing mode disruption 
(making selective focused attention problematic). These difficulties 
can be mitigated with the correct preparation of the environment 
and individual prior to practice and by specific guidance to support 
table 3 | Guidance for delivery of mindful movement for psychotic 
patients.
Main mindfulness 
instruction
specific guidance modifications with patients
Awareness of 
sensations
Increased prompts due to poor attention and high 
distractibility
Increased support for voluntary attentional shifts (“just 
keep bringing attention back to the movement”)
More specific guidance about the types of sensations 
that may be attended to
Encouragement of self-generated alterations to 
movements and their sensory consequences
Awareness of  
the present 
moment (pm)
Ask to keep checking if the sensation they feel is the 
same moment-by-moment
Exploring the suggestion that no two movements are 
the same
Reminders that each movement is a brand new “present 
moment”
Exploring the temporal qualities (beginning, middle, 
and end of movements) and pacing of the movement 
sequences
Awareness of 
attention
Acknowledgment of increased mind-wandering
Acknowledgment of the effort required, and that this will 
improve with practice (using the gym/muscle training 
analogy)
Repeated reminders to monitor where the attention is at 
any given moment
Awareness of 
mind-wandering
Indicate that mind-wandering is normal
Treat all mental experiences as equivalent to physical 
sensations (including “abnormal” or distressing mind-
wandering such as voices, imagery etc.)
Point to categories and types of mind-wandering
Awareness of 
intention (on 
purpose)
Repeated reminders about the intention to attend
Reminders about why this practice is helpful
Prompts to attend to the intention to move
Awareness of 
non-judgment
Repeated reminders about the intention to be gentle with 
physical and mental experiences
Reminders to be gentle in response to distressing 
symptoms
Supporting and encouraging any attempt at a movement 
(no right or wrong way to move)
Reminders to be gentle with self and others
box 6 | bMt class structure.
(1) What participants do
The class is roughly 45–60  min during which gentle movements of all the 
major joints and a number of short tai chi sequences are conducted. The 
sequence of movements is a relatively flexible and can be adapted depending 
on the clinical characteristics of the group and the setting conditions.
The method is flexible in that it can be delivered to an open, rolling class as 
well as a semi-structured, cumulative teaching group. For the latter, teaching 
materials (handouts and stickers) are included for participants so they can 
take home and reflect on the key learning points, and have a visual prompt to 
remind them (for example) to slow down and attend to the body throughout 
their day.
(2) How they do it
(a) Start moving: participants initially observe a movement (for example, 
a backwards arm rotation) and copy the instructor, completing the 
movement in whatever way is possible (with an emphasis on finding 
what they can do, rather than what they cannot).
(b) Move mindfully: once they have the general gist of the movement, they 
are instructed to follow the more detailed guidance of the instructor to 
the best of their ability.
Several aspects are emphasized:
(i) the mental activity related to the intention to move;
(ii) the specifics of the execution of the movement;
(iii) the sensory consequences of the movement;
(iv) the mental activity on-going during the movement.
In terms of mindfulness training, made explicit in the teaching of the class are 
the five principles of BMT:
(i) Go slow and see what happens
(ii) Engage with the activity intentionally
(iii) Pay attention
(iv) Learn more about yourself
(v) Be kind to self and others
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attention from the facilitator. The moving body provides rich (and 
perhaps novel) sensations to support focused attention and reduce 
distractibility (as proposed by load theory).
Clinical application of Mindful Movement: a 
description of a practical experience with 
psychotic patients
In the following sections, we share our experience of working with 
adults with severe and enduring mental health conditions, offering 
mindful movement classes to inpatients in various settings. These 
observations arise from work on the development of a mindful 
movement protocol called Body in Mind Training (BMT; Russell, 
2011; Russell and Tatton-Ramos, 2014) designed by one of the 
authors (TR, see Box 6). BMT uses a series of movements, many 
of which are derived from tai chi, performed with directed atten-
tion. This training has been developed primarily in the mental 
health setting, both with acutely ill and more stabilized community 
patients.
There are three aspects of what happens in this class, which 
may explain the beneficial effects observed. One is the care taken 
to support a down-ward shift in the tonic levels of arousal (from 
high to low). The second is the use of slow body movements, 
engaging (and competing with) the same simulating system 
as is engaged in mind-wandering. The third is the guidance of 
the facilitator, providing an auxiliary working memory system 
(holding intention, altering the mind to mind-wandering, 
guiding them back “on task”).
Creating Environmental and Psychological Conditions to 
Reduce Arousal
Individuals in psychotic states are suspicious, frightened, feel 
persecuted, and their sensory perception is distorted (e.g., hal-
lucinations). Table 1 shows the underlying neurophysiology of 
these high levels of arousal. Extra care is therefore needed to create 
a suitable physical and psychological space for this work. In terms 
of environment, these groups are best delivered in a relatively quiet 
and well-ventilated area, ideally off the ward. A gym environment 
is ideal as it helps to frame this training as something one might 
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do in everyday life (rather than being seen as a “treatment”), it 
encourages those who might be reluctant to attend a “mindfulness” 
or “meditation” group, and may increase the chance that these 
practices are continued following discharge from hospital.
Participants have commented that music helps them to settle 
when coming from busy ward/urban environments, and addition-
ally that it helps to mask some of the distracting environmental 
sounds. Although typically music is not used in mindfulness 
classes, in this setting, it can help reduce arousal levels by serving 
as a noise filter. Music might be turned off halfway through the 
class in order to deliberately explore what happens in the mind (to 
attention and mind-wandering) when there are more distractions.
From a psychological point of view, the instruction in 
ST-Mindfulness to sit still, in silence and with eyes closed, is not ideal 
for psychotic patients and may even increase distress. The requirement 
to copy the facilitator’s movements requires visual attention, so eyes 
must (initially at least) be open. Encouraging the spirit of curiosity 
and experimentation, participants can be invited to experiment with 
eyes open or closed, if they feel comfortable to do so.
In mindfulness training, a critical step is the personal decision 
to choose to engage with mental and physical experiences in a 
different way. In these classes therefore, there is a chance to explore 
personal responsibility and engagement with self and one’s actions. 
Participation is explicitly voluntary, with each participant respon-
sible for their own level of engagement. This may provide a rare 
therapeutic opportunity for autonomy. Participants can lie down, 
sit down, take a break, and regulate their involvement; the only 
rule is to be considerate of others in the class. There is thus a high 
degree of flexibility in delivery, which allows participants to find 
their own way to start moving mindfully. Modeling gentleness in 
every instruction and response is extremely important to counteract 
the aggression these individuals are experiencing internally (e.g., 
the negative and derogatory comments in auditory hallucinations).
Learning and Performing Movement Sequences
In BMT, some of the movements may be familiar (for example, 
a “swimming backwards” arm movement) while others might be 
new sequences of movements (moves adapted from Tai Chi such 
as “wave hands like clouds”). New movements require engagement 
of working memory and attentional focus (as described in Section 
“Movements”). When introducing new movements, there needs 
to be enough challenge without being overwhelming. Scaffolded 
learning methods (Young et al., 2002) can be used, with the facilita-
tor providing “step down” options if the full movement sequence 
is not possible for either cognitive or physical reasons. Participants 
are encouraged to modify, adapt, slow down, or do whatever is 
necessary to get into the sequence, but to keep on trying, with 
each movement a new opportunity to start again. An unexpected 
observation in these classes was the way self-efficacy was developed 
when participants supported each other to learn new sequences. 
During the learning phase, the non-judging component of mind-
fulness needs to be strongly emphasized.
The transition between movement sequences tends to be much 
quicker, in order to combat the increased potential for mind-
wandering and hold the attentional focus. Table  3 shows some 
specific guidance points related to holding attention on sensations 
and working with mind-wandering. New and familiar movements 
may be interwoven throughout the class and new movements 
revisited to provide experiences of different levels of mental effort 
(and a chance to notice different types of mental reactivity).
Some participants may not be able to do the movements 
slowly, so they are invited to play with the pacing of the move-
ments. Changing the speed brings automatic movements into the 
controlled mode and results in different kinematics and sensory 
experiences. Optimally, movements are conducted slowly and 
gracefully, however the main invitation is to notice how sensations 
can be different at different speeds.
Specific Guidance
Participants are first invited to copy the movement of the instructor 
in order to get the general gist of the movement. Copying move-
ments may reduce the cognitive demands engaged in planning 
and executing movement via automatic engagement of the mirror 
neuron system, known to be activated when we observe others 
moving (Rizzolatti et al., 2009).
Participants are additionally given specific, frequent verbal 
guidance. This guidance supports the dysfunctional working 
memory by alleviating the requirement for the patient to hold 
their intention (to move, to attend, to shift, and re-orient attention 
to the body) in their working memory system. The use of frequent 
verbal prompts helps to orient attention and the moving body is the 
object for the attention. In this way, “top-down” cognitive support 
is provided (see also Chadwick, 2014).
Suggested guidance modifications are shown in Table 3 and are 
framed around Kabat-Zinn’s definition of mindfulness. The guid-
ance points to what you might attend to in the movement [including 
sensations from the body, movement features as well as the things 
that might capture attention (internal/external distractions)]. This 
allows a detailed description of bodily sensations and movement 
processes alongside guidance that helps participants to see it is pos-
sible to hear a voice or experience an image, and without denying or 
fighting it, gently moving their attention to the body and returning 
to the present moment. Prompting an adjustment of posture or 
suggesting a modification to the movement helps to re-orient the 
individuals’ attention and de-couple from the mind-wandering.
A specific difference between this training for these patients in 
a mental health setting and what might occur in a “community” 
contemplative movement class, is the acknowledgment within the 
guidance of the mental experience of these participants (rapid 
thoughts, high arousal/anxiety, disorganized thinking, and dis-
tressing imagery or voices). Developing this type of strategy to 
work with positive symptoms like auditory hallucinations has been 
suggested as a key intervention (Shergill et al., 1998). For example, 
saying “noticing if the mind is distracted by internal dialog, voices, 
or imagery and without judging that experience, trying your best 
to come back to the sensation of the movement of the shoulder 
blade, noticing the speed, the effort, any places of tightness or 
ease.” This instruction is much more detailed in comparison to a 
more traditional guidance, which might say invite participants to 
“just notice the mind-wandering and bring it back to the body.”
In summary, these clinical observations of the delivery of mind-
ful movement to psychotic patients speak to the face validity of the 
theoretical ideas. The “how” of these mindful movement sessions is 
different from a typical contemplative movement class; the delivery 
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is adapted, the movements are adapted, and the modified guidance is 
critical. It has been suggested that delivery of mindfulness in any for-
mat to individuals with severe and enduring mental health conditions 
requires a facilitator who is experienced not only with mindfulness, 
but additionally with psychosis and psychological therapy (Chadwick, 
2014). In BMT, movement experience is also required.
discussion
summary
Based on the literature, this article has highlighted some candidate 
processes (neurophysiological and neuropsychological) that are 
likely implicated in mindfulness training using movements. 
A case for an essential role of the LC/NA system and working 
memory (particularly the CE and the episodic buffer components) 
has been made. We hypothesized that these components may be 
directly involved in maintaining the focus of attention within 
intended goals and staying within the experience, as it unfolds 
moment-by-moment. We described evidence from the literature 
that the moving body also engages the same neurophysiological 
and neuropsychological systems. A distinction was made between 
contemplative movements and mindfulness movements on the 
basis of the explicit training of attention and insight into mental 
experiences (e.g., mind-wandering) that occurs in the latter. Below, 
we draw together evidence from the neuroimaging literature to 
support the suggestion that the distinct phenomena of “meditat-
ing,” “moving,” and “experiencing psychotic symptoms” are associ-
ated with activity in certain (similar) brain networks (including 
the DMN, the SN, and an attentional/executive network). We 
propose that training with mindful movements engages these 
networks via a different route, one that is possible for those with 
schizophrenia, as detailed in our clinical observations (Section 
“Clinical Application of Mindful Movement: A Description of a 
Practical Experience with Psychotic Patients”).
We have described the role of the DMN in mind-wandering and 
how activity in the DMN activity can be diminished via medita-
tion. DMN activity may also be reduced when working memory 
load is increased (Koshino et al., 2014). Working memory load is 
increased when planning and executing movements. Therefore, 
mindful movement is likely to be associated with reduced activity 
in the DMN. Engaging working memory via mindful movement 
also places demands on the attentional/executive and SNs. Shifting 
between these networks (states of mind-wandering versus attend-
ing to movement) is thus required when moving in a mindful 
way. For this reason, the combination of movements with mindful 
attention meditation training may be particularly effective to 
reduce mind-wandering, whilst training the focus of attention.
The ability to engage and disengage DMN, SN, and the 
attentional/executive networks may involve phasic activation of 
the LC/NA system, to facilitate flexible responding in the face 
of ever-changing environmental conditions (Bouret and Sara, 
2005). In schizophrenia, the LC/NA system is dysfunctional, 
and there is evidence of impairment in these three networks 
(Palaniyappan and Liddle, 2012; Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford, 
2012; Orellana and Slachevsky, 2013). Poor switching between 
internal and external foci of attention may also contribute to the 
observed cognitive impairments (Whitfield-Gabrieli and Ford, 
2012). We thus suggest that impairments in flexible and adaptive 
responding, requiring the integration of stimuli from internal and 
external sources, via modulation of these three networks (DMN, 
attentional/executive networks, and SN) is impaired in psychotic 
patients and may arise from LC/NA system deficits. Palaniyappan 
and Liddle (2012) have suggested that the SN has a role pivotal 
to shifting between these networks. However, our clinical experi-
ence shows that mindful movement may, with modifications, be 
able to mitigate the impact of these impairments and provide a 
route to mindfulness training.
Hyper-connectivity in the DMN (described in Section 
“Clinical Populations”) has also been associated with the cogni-
tive abnormalities and positive symptoms seen in schizophrenia. 
These patients are highly distractible and lost in their inner 
world, paying little attention to external sensory information. 
They also have impaired working memory. For these reasons, 
mindfulness training needs to be adapted, in a way that takes 
into account the underlying disrupted mechanisms (and conse-
quent impaired performance). We have spoken about the extra 
guidance requirements to support this training (Table  3 and 
Section “Specific Guidance”). The additional guidance operates 
as a top-down support for movement planning and execution. 
This may partially compensate for executive functioning deficits 
in these patients (operating as an auxiliary working memory 
system) and modulate the attentional/executive network. 
Similar methods (directing attention to the relevant features 
to be observed) have been used to improve performance on a 
facial emotion recognition task in schizophrenia (Russell et al., 
2008; Marsh et al., 2010).
The hyper-connectivity in DMN is also associated with prob lems 
inferring the mental states of others (theory of mind). Theory of 
mind develops from the natural capacity of the brain to simulate the 
intentions of others on the basis of observed movement (Blakemore 
and Decety, 2001), and is impaired in schizophrenia (Russell et al., 
2006). This simulation system, associated with the DMN (Buckner 
et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009) may thus be engaged during mindful 
movement as participants observe and copy intentional movements. 
So, in addition to the top-down support provided, the requirement 
to observe and copy movements may offer a different (bottom-up) 
entry point into these same systems.
possible research
There remain however, a number of outstanding questions, which 
may provide avenues for future research. Investigations may be 
conducted at a variety of levels of explanation (neurophysiological, 
neuropsychological, clinical).
At the level of neurophysiology, one research avenue would be 
to test more formally whether mindfulness training will change 
the tonic and/or phasic firing rates of the LC/NA system. A second 
avenue might be to explore whether mindful movement training 
will impact on the DMN and/or other network activity in a way 
that is different from ST-Mindfulness. Static and movement-based 
interventions matched for every aspect by except movement might 
be compared in healthy participants. Distinctions were also made 
between contemplative and mindful movement trainings and 
these could also be compared, both at the neurophysiological and 
psychological levels.
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From a psychological point of view, we have touched on a number 
of theories that may explain why movements provide a potent atten-
tional focus. Incoming sensory information from the body during 
movement is different from that experienced during static practices. 
Using load theory as a framework (in both healthy and psychiatric 
patients), the differential effect on distractibility could be tested.
Baddeley’s model could provide a framework to explore the 
benefits of mindfulness training on working memory. Tests of 
working memory (and its different sub-components) could be 
administered to meditators of different levels of experience (and 
including those who may come from contemplative movement 
traditions, or who have been trained in mindful movement). 
Tests of working memory could also be administered to patient 
groups who are undergoing different types of mindfulness train-
ing (movement, non-movement) to determine the malleability of 
this cognitive impairment and determine if there is any enduring 
effect of the training. Baddeley’s model, although suggested to 
process multimodal representations, does not explicitly refer to 
multisensory information coming from internal sources (e.g., the 
body); it is not clear how sensory information from the body gets 
into the working memory system and/or is transformed into a 
higher order representations (Quak et al., 2015).
From a clinical point of view, given the link between NA, stress, 
and relapse, another avenue might be to determine whether a 
mindful movement program can help to prevent relapse (monitor-
ing admissions or clinic visits for example) or increase compliance 
in other therapies (perhaps via an adjunctive effect). Furthermore, 
given that the illness of schizophrenia includes motor abnormali-
ties, a further line of research might look at changes in measures 
of gait and movement kinetics following training in the deliberate, 
mindful engagement with the movement process.
Finally, as with ST-Mindfulness training, the effects of being 
in a group, sharing experiences, the experience of the facilitator 
and the non-judgmental space in which to explore the self are all 
likely contributors to the experience. In order to determine which 
of these factors are essential to any observed benefits, and deline-
ate the relative contribution of content and process, dismantling 
studies would need to be conducted (Williams et al., 2014). These 
types of studies compare tightly controlled conditions to tease out 
the relative contribution of each of the components (for example, 
offering movements alone without sharing of experience, varying 
the experience level of the facilitator, or offering the training in a 
group versus individual format). In order to measure the efficacy 
of any mindful movement program, it will be necessary to tease 
apart the effect of movement, mindfulness, and then the combined 
effect of moving mindfully.
limitations
One limitation in this work is the ability to measure accurately 
changes in the felt sense of the body (Mehling et  al., 2009). 
Although mindfulness training increases the window of conscious-
ness with respect to movement, there are still core impenetrable 
elements of movement that lie well out of the reach of awareness 
(as described in Box 4). The measurement of body awareness is 
highly problematic in healthy participants, and perhaps even more 
so in psychiatric populations. However, this does not preclude 
measurement of clinical and/or cognitive outcomes following 
mindfulness training.
Another important issue is how best to address the flexibility 
inherent in the delivery, and whilst still offering an effective and 
replicable outcome. Measures of both physical and cognitive change 
may be useful in this respect and help to disentangle aspects that 
are core to the efficacy from those that might be interchangeable.
Conclusion
Ultimately mindfulness training is a way to help manage more 
skillfully no matter what the experience. Therefore, as is the case 
in the wider mindfulness research field, an alternative strategy is to 
find out what is helpful about these interventions from participants 
directly, gathering qualitative information to understand what 
is really making the difference in their lives as a result of these 
practices. We end with an anecdote from a participant who suffers 
from schizophrenia who had been attending a drop-in mindfulness 
movement class. After practicing mindful walking, he was able, 
even when experiencing paranoid thoughts, to leave his home 
and go to the shop to buy milk to make a cup of tea. On that short 
journey, he maintained his attention on his feet, and his body as he 
moved, step by step, and managed to do something that previously 
would have been impossible. Even such a small thing that most of 
us would take for granted, can make a huge difference for these 
clients. Our intention with this article is to stimulate ideas and 
research that can continue this work.
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